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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LAMONT EPPERSON,
Petitioner/ Appellant,
v.

:

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 970075-CA
Priority No. 15

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appealfromafinalorder of the Utah State Retirement Board which
dismissed Petitioner's Request for Board Action. This court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. 63-46b-16 to review afinalagency action in a formal adjudicative proceeding.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue in this case is whether a divorced spouse of a retired Fire Department
employee is entitled to a court ordered share of his death benefit if the retirant is not
survived by a spouse to whom he was married at the time of death.
The standard of review is a correction-of-error standard as set forth in Morton
International. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991)

NATURE OF THE CASE
In accordance with the rules of procedure for determining retirement claims,
Petitionerfileda Request for Board Action with the Retirement Board seeking a
determination that his former spouse, Verla Epperson, would be entitled to death benefits
which were awarded to her in the divorce action if she survives him. The Retirement
Board argued that the applicable statute, Section 49-5-704 Utah Code Ann, permits a
death benefit to a former spouse in accordance with an award of a divorce court only if the
retirant has remarried and is survived by the subsequent spouse. Petitioner argued that the
statute clearly provides divorced spouses with retirement and death benefits when ordered
by the divorce decree regardless of the retirant's marital status at the time of death. In the
alternative, Petitioner attempted to present evidence that recent amendments to the statute
at issue, drafted with the assistance of Board counsel, were specifically intended to
provide death and retirement benefits to Petitioner's spouse. The Board refused to admit
evidence of legislative intent and ruled the former spouse ineligible for any portion of
Petitioner's death benefits.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Petitioner and Verla Epperson were divorced on April 13, 1992. (R. pp. 2-10,
24, 73) after over 43 years of marriage.
2. Throughout the marriage Petitioner was an employee of the Salt Lake City Fire
Department (the Fire Department). (R. p. 24)
3. Petitioner retiredfromthe Fire Department on September 1, 1992. (R. p. 73)
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4. The Fire Department opted out of the Social Security system maintaining
instead its own pension benefit system. Verla Epperson is not entitled to any Social
Security benefits stemmingfromPetitioner's employment with the Fire Department. (T.
p. 33)
5. When Petitioner retiredfromthe Fire Department, a Domestic Relations Order
was signed providing that Mrs. Epperson was entitled to 50% of Petitioner's pension
benefits and "100% of the spouse's death benefit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 49-5704...." (R. p. 25)
6. Verla Epperson has not remarried, is 66 years old, unemployed and worked only
sporadically during the marriage entitling her to a very small social security benefit in her
own right.
7. Petitioner is 69 years old, suffers from leukemia and is in failing health.
8. Petitioner has not remarried. (R. p. 73)
MARSHALING THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE DECISION BY THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD
This is a case offirstimpression interpreting the 1994 amendments to Section 495-704 Utah Code Ann.. The Board held that Section 49-5-704 creates a "spousal death
benefit" only if there is a surviving spouse to whom the member is married at the time of
death. Otherwise, there is no death benefit to award to Petitioner's former spouse.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Board erred when it ruled that section 49-5-704 requires a retirant be married
at the time of death in order for a former spouse to receive survivors benefits awarded to
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her in the divorce. Petitioner's former spouse, Verla Epperson, was awarded all of
Petitioner's survivors benefits in their divorce decree if he dies before she does regardless
of his marital status. Petitioner has brought this action to insure that his former wife is
provided with these benefits after he dies. The only dispute is with the Retirement
Board's interpretation of the applicable statute which is not consistent with the plain
language of the statute and, to the extent the statute is at all ambiguous, ignores the
history of both this case and the amendment to the statute. The Board further erred in
refusing to allow evidence of legislative history to prove legislative intent.

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner attempted to introduce evidence by way of the testimony Representative
Mary Carlson which would have proved that the legislative intent in amending Section 495-704 was to provide benefits to Verla Epperson in particular, and similarly situated
divorced spouses in general. That evidence would have shown that Verla Epperson was
awarded a one half interest in Petitioner's pension fund at the time of their divorce in
1992. When Petitioner retired, Mrs. Epperson learned that the Fire Department had opted
out of the Social Security system and if Petitioner died before she did she would not be
entitled to any Social Security benefits or survivor benefits from his 43 years employment
with the Fire Department. Knowing that Petitioner suffered from a fatal disease, and
fearing he would die prematurely leaving her with virtually no income, Mrs. Epperson
sought the assistance of her State Representative, Mary Carlson.
Representative Carlson contacted the Retirement Board and discussed Mrs.
Epperson's situation with the Board. It was determined that a change in Section 49-5-704
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was necessary to make Mrs. Epperson eligible to receive survivor benefits. Counsel for
the Retirement Board helped craft the language of HB 32. Representative Carlson
sponsored the bill which was passed and signed into law in 1994. This law amended the
provisions of Section 49-5-704 to its present language. While it is true these amendments
would benefit all individuals who are similarly situated, the amendments were written for,
sponsored on behalf of and intended to provide benefits to Verla Epperson.
After passage of the legislation, Mrs. Epperson contacted the Retirement Board
and was told she needed a Domestic Relations Order awarding her a portion Petitioner's
death benefit. The complying order was signed by District Court Judge Pat B. Brian on
May 10, 1996. (R. pp. 23-29) She then learned that the Board's interpretation of the
1994 amendments to Section 49-5-704 would deny her benefits unless her former
husband, Petitioner, was married at the time of his death. Petitioner, believing that his
former spouse was entitled to receive those benefits regardless of his marital status at the
time of death, objected to the Board's interpretation of the law and petitioned for a formal
determination of future benefits in compliance with Rule 1 of the Board's rules governing
declaratory orders.
Denying Petitioner's request to present legislative history to prove legislative
intent, the Board dismissed the Request interpreting the 1994 amendment as requiring that
a retirant remarry and be survived by a dependent spouse in order for his divorced spouse,
Mrs. Epperson, to receive the death benefits she was awarded in the divorce. The Board
further ruled that the statute in question was clear and unambiguous on its face and denied
Petitioner's request to introduce evidence of legislative history and intent.
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ARGUMENT
I. SECTION 49-5-704 DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A RETIRANT REMARRY
IN ORDER FOR A FORMER SPOUSE TO RECEIVE COURT ORDERED
DEATH BENEFITS.
Section 49-5-704 provides:
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the death benefit
payable to a dependent spouse after death of the retirant is a monthly
amount equal to 75% of the allowance being paid to the retirant at the time
of death.
(b) The effective date of the accrual of this pension is the first
day of the month following the month the retirant died.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (3), payment of the full
pension for this latter month shall be made to the dependent beneficiary
instead of the deceased member.
(2) If the member retires under Division B and dies leaving
dependent children, they qualify for benefits prescribed for children under
Section 49-5-701 or 49-5-702.
(3) (a) In the event of a court order complying with Section 49-1609 a former spouse of a retired member is entitled to the court designated
share of the retirant's monthly retirement benefit and the court designated
share of the spouse's death benefit.
(b) This subsection superseded conflicting subsections of this
section.
Respondent held that this Section should be interpreted to mean that a death
benefit only comes into existence if there is a dependent spouse to whom the retirant is
married at the time of death. In making this determination, the Board ignored the clear
intent of subsection (3) to provide benefits to a, former spouse of the retirant when
ordered in the parties' divorce decree.
The plain language of subsection (3) and the 1994 amendment make it clear that its
purpose is to provide a means for a divorced, dependent spouse to receive a portion of the
retirant's retirement and death benefits. It was clearly not intended to only provide a
means for dividing a death benefit between a current and former spouse in the event the
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retirant remarries. Had that been the legislature's intent, it could have easily made that
clear just as it has in other sections of the retirement act. For instance, the code provision
which provides for death benefits to inactive members states:
49-5-703 (2) (a) The death benefit payable monthly on behalf of an
inactive member who dies and is survived by a spouse to whom that
member was married at the time of death is 50% of the amount the
member would have received had the member retired on the first day of the
month following the month death occurred.... Utah Code Ann, [emphasis
supplied]
If the legislature wanted to provide death benefits to a former spouse in Section
49-5-704 only if the retirant was married at the time of death, it would have added the
same or similar language found in Section 49-5-703. By not including similar language it
must mean that the term spouse can be used to include former spouse, or someone to
whom the member was not married at the time of death.
Section 49-5-704 is clearly written to provide a portion of a retirant's retirement
and death benefits to a former spouse when ordered by the court. In fact, this statute was
written for the specific purpose of providing those benefits to Mrs. Epperson.
Respondent's argument that the statute was intended to provide benefits to a former
spouse only if her ex-husband remarries is not supported by any language in the statute, is
directly contradicted by the purpose for adopting this particular statute, and is arbitrarily
narrow. The only reasonable interpretation of the law is that Mrs. Epperson is entitled to
receive Petitioner's death benefit if he predeceases her regardless of his marital status in
accordance with the provision of their divorce decree.
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II. THE RETIREMENT BOARD ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE
INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO ESTABLISH
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Legislative history is only admissible to prove legislative intent when the statute in
question is ambiguous. Then the court will "seek guidancefromthe legislative history and
relevant policy considerations." World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 879 P.2d
253 (Utah 1994) Ambiguous is defined in Webster's Desk Dictionary as "capable of being
understood in more than one way." The dispute in this case involves the interpretation of
a statute. Petitioner believes the statute clearly entitles Mrs. Epperson to receive a
spouse's death benefit if she survives him. If there is any doubt about that, the legislative
history would be highly relevant since it would show that the statute in question was
intended to resolve this specific case. The Board's refusal to allow that evidence into the
formal record in this case was clear error.
The Board's refusal to admit evidence of legislative history was based on its
finding that the statute was clear and unambiguous. Respondent admitted that the statute
was unclear in its Motion to Dismiss stating that there is a "cloud over the meaning of the
statute in question here." (R. pp. 37, 48) Yet Respondent strenuously objected to the
introduction of any legislative history. When even the Respondent admitted the statute
was subject to a different interpretation, the Board should have allowed the introduction
of legislative history to establish intent.
Respondent's reading of the statute is both tortured and disingenuous in light of
the history of this case. The Retirement Board was asked by Representative Carlson for
assistance in the drafting of legislation to provide benefits to this very party. To be asked
to assist a legislator in the drafting of legislation which will provide benefits to Mrs.
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Epperson and then to subsequently claim that the legislation did NOT do what was
intended AND to block introduction of the very legislative history which will prove intent
is duplicitous. This is especially true in light of Respondent's characterization that there
was a "cloud over the meaning of the statute in question here."
The court can also look to relevant policy considerations in interpreting the statue.
Since the Fire Department opted out of the Social Security system, its replacement
pension plan should provide benefits of an equivalent nature. Had the Fire Department
contributed to the Social Security system, Mrs. Epperson would have been eligible for
survivor benefits after ten years of marriage. Here, after 43 years of marriage, she will
receive no survivor benefits. In a society where we encourage women to stay at home, we
should not render themfinanciallydestitute in the event of a divorce.
The Adjudicative Hearing Officer erroneously concluded that the statute denied
benefits to Petitioner and erred in holding that the statute was clear and unambiguous on
its face. Petitioner brought Representative Carlson to the hearing to testify on the
legislative history and intent in this case. (T. p. 3) She would have testified that it was the
o

intent of the legislature to provide benefits to Mrs. Epperson and former spouses similarly
situated regardless of the marital status of the retirant at the time of death. This evidence
should have been admitted.
IE. THE STATUTE IN QUESTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN LIBERALLY
CONSTRUED SO AS TO PROVIDE BENEFITS IN THIS CASE.
Section 49-1-102 (2) states: "This title should be liberally construed to provide
maximum benefits and protections consistent with soundfiduciaryand actuarial
principles."
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The statute in question here was intended to provide benefits to Petitioner's former
spouse, Verla Epperson. The most logical reading of that statute would in fact provide
her with those benefits. The Retirement Board should have "liberally construed" the
provisions to provide her with those benefits.
CONCLUSION
Section 49-5-704 was written to provide benefits to Verla Epperson. The clear
language of that statute would provide her with those benefits. Petitioner asks this Court
to rule that the death benefit in question will go to Mrs. Epperson if she survives
Petitioner regardless of his marital status at the time of death. In the alternative, Petitioner
asks the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the Retirement Board with instructions
to admit evidence of legislative history to prove legislative intent.
Dated this 28th day of May, 1997.

~/AK

Suzan Pixton
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of May, 1997,1 delivered two true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner/Appellant to:
Howard & Associates
Daniel D. Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

^
^
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ADDENDUM

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

LAMONT EPPERSON,
Petitioner,
DECLARATORY ORDER
v.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Respondent.

FACTS

1.

Petitioner Lamont Epperson retired from the Salt Lake City Fire Department on

September 1,1992.
2.

Mr. Epperson is alive and currently receiving a monthly retirement benefit from the

Utah Retirement Systems.
3.

Mr. Epperson and his former spouse, Verla Epperson, were divorced on April 13,

4.

Mrs. Epperson is currently receiving a portion of Mr. Epperson's monthly retirement

1992.

benefit pursuant to a domestic relations order.
5.

Mr. Epperson has not remarried since his divorce from Mrs. Epperson.
LAW

Utah Code Annotated §49-5-704 states:
(1)
(a)
Except as provided in Subsection (3), the death benefit payable to a dependent
spouse after death of the retirant is a monthly amount equal to 75% of the allowance being paid to
the retirant at the time of death.

(b)
The effective date of accrual of this pension is the first day of the month
following the month the retirant died.
(c)
Except as provided in Subsection (3), payment of the full pension for this
latter month shall be made to the dependent beneficiary instead of the deceased member.
(2)
If the member retires under Division B and dies leaving dependent children, they
qualify for benefits prescribed for children under Section 49-5-701 or 49-5°702o
(3)
(a)
In the event of a court order complying with Section 49=1 -609 a former spouse
of a retired member is entitled to the court designated share of the retirant's monthly retirement
benefit and the court designated share of the spouse's death benefit.
(b)

This subsection supersedes conflicting subsections of this section.
ORDER

Utah Code Annotated Section 49-5-704(1) (a) creates a spousal death benefit only if the
firefighter is remarried at the time of death. Section (3) (a) grants a former spouse a right to a court
ordered share of the firefighter's monthly retirement benefit while he is alive, and a court ordered
portion of the current spouse's death benefit. If no spousal death benefit exists under Section (l)(a),
a former spouse has no spousal death benefit upon which a claim can be made.
Assuming Mr. Epperson is not remarried at the time of his death, Mrs. Epperson, as a former
spouse, has no right to a death benefit under the statute.

iUi

-

jMis

L. BARKER,
ADJUDICATIVE HEARING OFFICER

IZJ^M
DATE
c:\...dan\eppmo2.pld

^ y ^ t y > / //.

,^«.A/^-.

Edgar H. Throndsen, Board President
/

Date

PENSIONS

49-5-601
PART 6
BENEFIT ADJUSTMENTS

49-5-601. A n n u a l cost-of-living allowance*
(1) (a) The retirement office shall compute and pay, upon
approval by the board, an annual coat-of-living adjustment to all retired members after those members have
been retired for one year.
(b) The adjustment is equal to the decrease in the
purchasing power of the dollar during the preceding year,
as measured by the Consumer Price Index, United States
City Average, prepared by the United States Bureau of
Labor Statistics, and is limited to a maximum of 4% of the
retirant's or beneficiary's original retirement allowance.
(c) Decreases in the purchasing power of the dollar
exceeding 4% annually are accumulated and used in
subsequent allowances when the cost-of-living adjustment is less than 4% annually.
(2) (a) The cost-of-living adjustment shall be reduced if the
index shows a decline of 4% or more during any period of
more than one year.
(b) These reductions may not exceed 2% per year based
upon the original retirement allowance.
(c) Payments made under this section are a part of the
retired member's allowance.
(d) Payments and adjustments for the retirant also
apply to the beneficiary who is paid an allowance under
optional retirement plans.
(e) The net cost of increasing the coat-of-living adjustment from 2 Wh to 4% annually under this section, after
recognizing the decrease in the contribution rates for
actuarial expense, is 1.74% for Division A firefighters and
1.9% for Division B firefighters. The net cost shall be
added to the employee contribution rate in Division A and
Division B.
1994
49-5-602. Minimum monthly allowance — Funded by
member contributions.
(1) In addition to the cost-of-living adjustments provided by
Section 49-5-601, the allowance of each retirant shall be
increased to a minimum of $500 per month and the allowance
of each spouse who qualifies for a monthly allowance shall be
increased to a minimum of $350 per month.
(2) The minimum benefit provided by this section shall be
funded by member contributions to be added to the base
member contribution under Section 49-5-301.
L990
PART 7
DEATH BENEFITS
w©-701. Death of active member in Division A —
Payment of benefits.
If an active member of the system enrolled in Division A
dies, the following benefits are payable:
(1) If death is classified as line-of-duty, the dependent
spouse receives a lump sum of $1,500 and a monthly
allowance equal to 30% of the deceased member's final
average monthly salary.
(2) If death is not classified as line-of-duty, the benefit
- is as follows:
(a) If the member has less than ten years of service
credit at the time of death, the member's beneficiary
receives $1,000 or a refund of contributions, whichever is greater.
(b) If the member has ten or more years of service
credit the dependent spouse receives $500 plus a
monthly allowance equal to 2% of the final average
monthly salary of the deceased member for each year
of service credit with a maximum of 30% allowed.
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(3) In the event of the death of the member and there isJ
no spouse, the spouse's benefit shall be equally divided
and paid to each unmarried child until the child reach*age 21.
(4) If the benefit ia not distributed under this sectiou,
and there is a beneficiary, the vested contribution shall be
paid to the beneficiary.
1990
49-6-702. D e a t h of a c t i v e m e m b e r i n D i v i s i o n B —
Payment of benefits.
If an active member of the system enrolled in Division B
dies, the following benefits are payable:
(1) If death is classified as line-of-duty, the dependent
spouse receives a lump sum of $1,500 and a monthly
allowance equal to 37 Vfc% of the deceased member's final
average monthly salary, subject to Section 49-5-503.
(2) If death ia classified as line-of-duty, and the member
has 20 or more years of service credit, the member shall be
considered to have retired and the dependent spouse shall
receive the death benefit payable to a retired member
under Section 49-5-704.
(3) If death is not classified as line-of-duty and the
deceased member has five or more years of service credit,
the death is considered line-of-duty and the same benefits
are payable as established under Subsection (1).
(4) If death is not classified as line-of-duty and the
deceased member has less than five years of service
credit, the benefit is a refund of the deceased member's
contributions, plus 50% of the member's most recent 12
months regular salary.
(5) If the deceased member has five or more years of
service credit, the member's unmarried children, until
they reach age 21, receive a monthly allowance of $75. In
the event of the death of the member and spouse, the
spouse's benefits are equally divided and paid to each
unmarried child until the child reaches age 21. The
payments shall be made to the surviving parent or duly
appointed guardian or pursuant to Section 49-1-607.
(6) If the benefit is not distributed under this section,
and there ia a beneficiary, the vested contribution shall be
paid to the beneficiary.
(7) The total monthly payments made on behalf of any
one deceased member's account may not exceed 75% of
the member's final average salary.
1992
49-5-703. Death of active or inactive member having
no spouse or minor children as beneficiary —
Benefits payable to widow on death of inactive member.
(1) The death settlement payable on behalf of an active or
inactive member who dies without spouse or minor children is
100% of the employee's contributions or $500, whichever is
larger.
(2) The death benefit payable monthly on behalf of an
inactive member who dies and is survived by a spouse to
whom the member was married at the time of death is 50% of
the amount the member would have received had the member
retired on the first day of the month following the month death
occurred, the computation being based upon years of service
and final average salary, reduced actuarially from age 50 to
age at death, if the member was not 50 years of age when
death occurred.
(3) No monthly pension may be paid under this section
unless the member had 20 years of service credit at the time of
death.

1994

49-5-704. D e a t h of retired m e m b e r — Benefits.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the death
benefit payable to a dependent spouse after death of the

49~6*1<
retirant is a monthly amount equal to 76% of the allowance being paid to the retirant at the time of death.
(b) The effective date of accrual of this pension is the
first day of the month following the month the retirant
died.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (3), payment of the
full pension for this latter month shall be made to the
dependent beneficiary instead of the deceased member.
(2) If the member retires under Division B and dies leaving
dependent children, they qualify for benefits prescribed for
children under Section 49-5-701 or 49-5-702,
(3) (a) In the event of a court order complying with Section
49=4-609 a former spouse of a retired member is entitled
to the court designated share of the retirant's monthly
retirement benefit and the court designated share of the
spouse's death benefit
(b) This subsection supersedes conflicting subsections
of this section.
1994

Section
49-6-403.
49-6-404.

Part5
Disability
49-6-501, 49-6-502. Repealed.
Parte
Benefit A d j ^ t m e s t
49-6-601.
49-6-602.

Death Benefits

MISCELLANEOUS
is«»

49-5-802. Volunteer firefighters considered members
of the system for line-of-duty death and disability benefits in Division A — Computation
of benefit.
Volunteer firefighters are considered members of the system
but are only eligible for line-of-duty death and line-of-duty
disability benefits provided for firefighters enrolled in Division
A, subject to Section 49-5-503 The lowest monthly salary of
firefighters of a city of the first class in this state at the time
of death or disability shall be the basis for computing the final
average monthly salary payable to a volunteer firefighter, the
surviving spouse, and children.
19*7
CHAPTERS
JUDGES' RETIREMENT ACT
Parti
General Provisions
Section
49-6-101.
49-6-102.
49-6-103.

Short title.
Purpose.
Definitions.
Part 2
The System and Fund

49-6-201.
49-6-202.
49-6-203.

Creation of system.
Creation of trust fund.
Eligibility for membership in the system.
Parts

49-6-301.

Contributions
Contributions by employees and employers —
Retirement fees — Report.
Part 4
Benefits

49-6-401.
49-6-402.

Annual cost-of-living adjustment.
Minimum retirement allowance.
Part?

PART 8

49-5-801. Repealed.

ment benefit — Adjustment to formula perm
ted.
Repealed.
Temporary retirement window for 20 years
service.

Eligibility for service retirement — Date of retirement — Qualifications.
Service retirement plan — Calculation of retire-

49-6-701.
49-6-702.

Death benefit for active and inactive members
before retirement — Computation of benefit.
Death benefit for active and inactive members
after retirement — Computation of benefit.
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

49-6-101. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Judges' Retirement Act."
1087

49-6-102. Purpose.
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a retirement plan
forjudges which provides the following:
(1) a uniform system of membership;
(2) retirement requirements;
(3) benefits for judges;
(4) funding on an actuarially sound basis;
(5) contributions made by employers and employees;
and
(6) economy and efficiency in public service.
ISST
49-6-103. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) (a) "Compensation," "salary," or *wages* means the
total amount of payments which are currently includable in gross income made by an employer to an
employee for services rendered to the employer.
(b) "Compensation* includes:
(i) performance-based bonuses;
(ii) cost-of-living adjustments;
(iii) payments subject to Social Security deductions;
(iv) any payments in excess of the ^ATi^mn
amount subject to deduction under Social Security law, and
(v) amounts which the employee authorizes to
be deducted or reduced for salary deferral or
other authorized benefit programs.
(c) "Compensation" for purposes of this chapter
may not exceed the amount allowed under Internal
Revenue Code Section 401(aX17)o
(d) "Compensation,* "salary,* or "wages* does not
include:
(i) the monetary value of remuneration paid in
kind, such as a residence or use of equipment;

